Una breve introduzione all’articolo sulla responsabilità di soci ed amministratori in situazioni di crisi in Russia attraverso un confronto comparatistico tra l’approccio adottato dai tribunali in quell’ordinamento – come di recente confermato dalla Suprema Corte – e quello di altri ordinamenti, in particolare quello italiano, sul dibattuto tema dell’individuazione dei soggetti in posizione di controllo e delle circostanze al verificarsi delle quali debba cadere il velo societario. Un tema che meriterebbe ulteriori riflessioni anche da parte del legislatore italiano.
From Russia, a contribution on the liability of parent companies and directors in situations of distress A brief presentation of the essay on the subsidiary liability of shareholders and directors by comparing the approach adopted by the Russian Courts – as recently confirmed by the Supreme Courts – with those of other legal systems, the Italian one in particular, to the debated topic of the identification of the circumstances the occurrence of which make it possible to pierce the corporate veil, a topic that would deserve further attention by the Italian legislators, too.
KEYWORDS: Russia – Supreme Court – controlling person – liability.
In the Russian Federation, legislative developments – and the relevant case law – concerning the liability of shareholders and directors of companies in distress appears to be moving along the lines of other legal systems in Europe, but with a more aggressive approach.
If compared with the approach of the Italian legislator, a radical difference can be noted with regard to the treatment of the liability of the directors, who respond in Italy towards creditors in case of mala gestio (mismanagement), whereas the Russian legislator seems to ground their liability – under certain conditions – on their qualification as controlling persons.
Interestingly, the Russian system places emphasis on the delayed acknowledgment of the crisis and commencement of an insolvency/restructuring procedure. The same emphasis that characterizes the new Insolvency Code recently adopted by the Italian legislator.
Shareholders who own 50% or more of the corporate capital are also considered controlling persons and as such respond vis-à-vis unsatisfied creditors, under certain conditions.
Here, too, we note a substantial difference with respect to the Italian legal system, where articles 2497 and ff of the Civil Code provide for the liability of the parent company only if evidence is provided (but direction and coordination is presumed if there is control pursuant to the civil code) that it carries out direction and coordination activity over and to the detriment of the company concerned.
In limited liability companies, where, as opposed to stock companies, quotaholders could take the role as directors, liability is acknowledged when it is proved that the quotaholder intentionally decided or authorized the action(s) causing damages to the company concerned, the other quotaholders or the creditors. In this case, the ground for the liability does not seem so different with respect to the provisions of the Russian law.
The case law mentioned in the article reinforces the impression of an aggressive approach, in particular as regards the contents of the 2017 Supreme Court’s ruling referred to therein. The Court recognized in that ruling a very extensive discretionary power – which is not limited by the literal meaning of the provisions in force – in determining the circumstances that cause the arising of the subsidiary liability of the controlling persons.
The more aggressive Russian approach, this is the perception, is able to catch those abuses of the limited liability that would remain unpunished under Italian law.
Nevertheless, in that jurisdiction, too, a wide and undetermined exceptions is provided for those actions carried out “… in the course of ordinary business activity, undertaking reasonable risk management and not aimed at violating rights and interests of the creditors …”, which do not cause [continua..]
